Introduction
On 25 November 2016, Fidel Castro died. He was the last surviving elite participant in the 1962 nuclear crisis, widely regarded as the closest humanity ever came to nuclear war. With his passing we have lost a direct link with the experience of very intense fear of imminent nuclear war, and with the learning of the crucial role of luck in preserving the world from nuclear devastation. From now on, our interpretation of the danger of the most dangerous crisis in the history of the nuclear age is radically detached from direct experience at the highest levels of decision-making.
At the same time, all nuclear weapons states are developing vast programmes to enhance their nuclear weapons capabilities, tensions between Russia and the West remain high, and the current US president is suspected by some to be more prone to using nuclear weapons in anger than any of his predecessors. 1 In such a context, this article offers a broader investigation of our beliefs about the taken these insights seriously. The unbearable lightness of luck seems constantly to escape the learning process. 8 This article explores three reasons for this failure to learn, focusing on ideational factors. I do not deny the role of institutional and bureaucratic dynamics in the entrenchment of representations related to nuclear weapons, which will be explored in a subsequent essay, but I do not analyse them here. Staying at the level of ideas emphasises the responsibility of scholars and analysts to work in the name of avoiding overconfidence without waiting for structural or institutional change. 9 Forms of learning that promote overconfidence have been documented across national cases. In India and Pakistan, as Russel Leng and S. Paul Kapur have noted: 'the learning that has occurred has been largely dysfunctional and dangerously hawkish'. 10 In the US, Pulitzer Prize winner and longtime analyst of US nuclear weapons policy Richard Rhodes similarly observed: 'despite several close calls, … no one in authority believes the damned things will go off, and so everyone wants to play with them, like treasure hunters wallowing in a vault of golden coins laced with guardian scorpions, like children discovering the loaded gun their parents thoughtlessly neglected to lock away.' 11 By contrast with the US and the UK, the other two nuclear-armed NATO states, France has received relatively little attention. Drawing on unexploited primary sources to illuminate this less-known case, the following article identifies and explains the limits to French nuclear learning.
In this context, France is a relevant case for two reasons. First, as Beatrice Heuser eloquently showed: 'while nuclear weapons also have a metaphysical dimension for other nuclear powers, it is most developed in France'. 12 France displays in particularly acute form some of the sources of overconfidence in the controllability of nuclear crises that can been found in other nuclear armed states. If official representatives of all nuclear weapons states tend to portray themselves as responsible custodians of their nuclear arsenals, the French stand out for their public display of confidence in the perfect safety record of their nuclear arsenal. On 1 May 2015, French Ambassador Jean-Yves Simon-Michel stated before the Main Committee I of the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference that: 'There is no risk of the [French nuclear] weapons being used non-intentionally.' Two weeks before, he had given a tour of the Luxeuil Air Force base and its former weapons storage facilities. He added that the visitors 'will have seen [this] for themselves'. 13 This article treats such public confidence in control over nuclear weapons as part of a puzzle, and analyses how such a statement has become possible and acceptable. Second, there is only very limited scholarship on the French experience and memory of the Crisis. In terms of historiography, most of the scholarship on the Crisis still tells the story of a bipolar confrontation and ignores the perspective and agency of actors other than the US and USSR, Cuba included.
What limited literature does exist on France is not available in English and ignores most of the primary and secondary sources analysed in this article: recently published memoirs, declassified archival material, testimonies of former policymakers and high-level military personnel, representations of the Crisis in the French media, specialised military and intellectual publications, and high school textbooks. 15 Overall, little has been written on the memory of key episodes in the nuclear age in France and their impact on French thinking about nuclear safety, security and possible nuclear futures. 16 In addressing the puzzle of how the discoveries about the role of luck in the outcome of the Crisis, never adequately refuted, have not been integrated in the accepted body of knowledge about nuclear history and policy, this article makes three contributions. First, the focus on new French primary sources is relevant to security studies as well as policymaking circles given frequent misconceptions about nuclear dynamics. Nuclear security studies scholars too often make unwarranted theory-driven extrapolations based on few or no primary sources, and latent assumptions about a common narrative of the danger, causes and consequences of the 'most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age' are widespread in Western nuclear policy circles. 17 Second, and consequently, the article tackles a widespread assumption of automaticity linking the presence of nuclear weapons to a fear-induced deterrent effect. Vipin Narang labelled this as 'an existential bias' in the literature on deterrence, focused on the acquisition of nuclear weapons as the only meaningful threshold, a bias that Daniel Deudney locates in the tradition of focused on the US and a second one including a Soviet and Cuban perspective. Christian Ostermann and James Hershberg (eds) The unbearable lightness of luck 'automatic deterrence statism' in the literature on nuclear weapons policy. 18 Indeed, this assumption crosses the policy divide over the desirability of nuclear disarmament. On the anti-disarmament side, Susan Martin recently summarised the issue in the following terms: 'nuclear weapons cannot be stripped of their values as a strategic deterrent' since '[their] strategic deterrent capability … stems from their material characteristics'. 19 As James Lebovic aptly summarises, in this tradition, the deterrent effect does not come from rational calculation but from fear: 'the existential deterrent acquires its power from the non rational world of fear'. 20 On the pro-disarmament side, proponents of 'virtual nuclear deterrence'
or 'weaponless deterrence' have to subscribe to an even more radical version of this idea for their concept to make sense. In their case, the weapons do not even need to be assembled in order to deter, their existence and the fear that they trigger need only exist in the mind of the deterred. 21 In other words, whether it is for deterrence or disarmament, the mere presence of nuclear weapons (physical or virtual) is expected to inspire fear on account of their destructive capacity; such a dynamic, if granted, would clearly constrain the scope for re-evaluation of these weapons. In other words, the value of nuclear weapons would be irreducibly determined by the physics of nuclear devastation and unaffected by social and political factors. Given the position of France in the middle of the expected European battlefield for the coming nuclear war of the 1960s, if it turns out that the French experience and memory of the Crisis were largely unmarked by fear, this widely-held assumption of the automaticity of the effect of the presence of nuclear weapons will be opened to further challenge. As a consequence, the valuation of nuclear weapons will be reassessed as a socially and historically constructed process, irreducible to destructive capacity alone. 22 Third, empirically, this study of the French case responds to Nick Ritchie's invitation to study 'regimes of value' of nuclear weapons beyond his foundational case study of the UK. 23 It also contributes to a growing literature on nuclear fear and atomic anxiety that has not documented the French experience in detail or consulted French-language primary sources.
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The rest of this article is divided in five parts. I first review the most recent literature on the Crisis, with evidence showing that the situation was indeed extremely dangerous and that its peaceful outcome cannot be reduced to successful, fully informed crisis-management. Nuclear weapons use was avoided in the autumn of 1962 not through restraint on the part of President Kennedy and the Soviet leadership only, but as a result of decisions made by individual nuclear operators, under conditions of incomplete or incorrect information. I then identify three reasons for why this interpretation, strengthened over the past three decades and never persuasively refuted, has still not been fully incorporated in scholarship and public discourse: rhetorical practices of epistemic and practical inconsistencies that acknowledge the role of luck but do not treat it adequately and bring it back 18 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton: 
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within the realm of controllability; a disciplinary rejection of counterfactual thinking as a legitimate scholarly practice and the memory of an idiosyncratic experience of the Crisis exempt of fear. It is historically inaccurate and politically unwise, I argue, to expect that analysts' post-facto confirmation of the danger confronted at the time will entail a corresponding learning process on the part of policymakers and the public, and I conclude by outlining the implications of this point for the scholarship in history and security studies.
The latest assessment of the possibility of nuclear use during the Cuban Missile Crisis
Even though discussion over the dangers of the Crisis continues, scholarship from the last three decades has reached compelling conclusions about the role of luck in its outcome, contingent on limited information, misperceptions, the limits of safety and presidential command and control over nuclear weapons, as well as the potential of accidents. As a 2015 literature review concluded, 'had everyone stopped researching … the crisis in the 1980s our awareness of the risks of nuclear war would be greatly diminished. If we had chosen to draw the lessons on the basis of our knowledge, we would almost certainly have drawn the wrong lessons.' 25 First, the limits of political leaders' knowledge about nuclear weapons during the Crisis have been exposed. For example, the Kennedy administration massively underestimated the number of Soviet troops in Cuba, ignored that they arguably could fire tactical weapons based in Cuba, and that Castro was actively pushing the Soviets to be more aggressive. 26 Second, and consequently, command and control problems also have to be taken into account, so that complete presidential control cannot be taken for granted. As Scott Sagan wrote twenty years ago, in a classic account:
Many serious safety problems, which could have resulted in an accidental or unauthorized detonation or a serious provocation to the Soviet government, occurred during the crisis. None of these incidents led to inadvertent escalation or an accidental war. All of them, however, had the potential to do so. President Kennedy may well have been prudent. He did not, however, have unchallenged final control over U.S. nuclear weapons. 
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For example, during the night of 26-7 October 1962, at the height of the Crisis, an American U-2 strayed into Soviet air space over the Arctic. Soviet fighter jets scrambled to intercept the U-2 while F-102 interceptors were sent to escort it home and prevent the Soviet MIGs from freely entering US airspace. Given the circumstances, the F-102s' conventional air-to-air missiles had been replaced with nuclear-tipped ones and their pilots could decide to use nuclear weapons: 'the interceptors at Galena were armed with the nuclear Falcon air-to-air missiles and, under existing safety rules, were authorized to carry the weapons in full readiness condition in any "active air defense" mission.' 29 Fortunately, the spy plane turned back and the Soviet jets held their fire.
30 On the Soviet side, a similar problem of the delegation of the authority to use nuclear weapons occurred. 31 Moreover, it is now well established that President Kennedy was often in a minority in opposing military action against Cuba during the 13 days of the Crisis (to follow the American periodisation). 32 A usual interpretation of the Crisis assuming complete control from the two leaders might find this comforting: his ability to resist Excomm pressure shows that he would never have used force, let alone nuclear weapons, during the Crisis. 33 However, finding confidence in the president's consistency is in itself problematic. It neglects, for instance, Kennedy's severe illness, dependence on steroids, and reliance on competing medical opinions and treatments from doctors with whom he did not share what the others were prescribing him, which might have affected his judgement.
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Third, the most recent research shows that weapons safety was very rudimentary at the time. For instance, in the early 1960s NATO weapon handlers pulled the arming wires out of a Mark 7 nuclear warhead while they were unloading it from a plane. 'When the wires were pulled, the arming sequence began -and if the X-Unit charged, a Mark 7 could be detonated by its radar, by its barometric switches, by its timer or by falling just a few feet from a plane and landing on 29 Ibid., p. 137. 30 Ibid., pp. 135-8. 31 Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War 35 In Italy, a few months before the Crisis, Jupiter missiles were hit by lightning four times, 'some of their thermal batteries fired, and in two of the warheads, tritium gas was released into their cores' and may have boosted a nuclear detonation. 36 One of the missiles rolled down a hill. 37 So, beyond the command and control problem outlined above, the safety of the weapons was very problematic at the time and accidental detonation of NATO weapons could have happened during the Crisis.
Fourth, those possibilities of accidents and miscalculations could have increased the danger of the Crisis in an indirect fashion, by degrading the common knowledge of the unacceptability of nuclear war that arguably kept the two leaders away from the brink: they could have led one of the two to think that nuclear war was imminent. As a result, one can reasonably claim that the danger of war was higher than leaders thought at the time. 38 In 2015, Len Scott reviewed the latest developments in the scholarship about the Crisis on this point and concluded: 'the emphasis on contingency and unacknowledged risk has accelerated with more evidence. Better understanding of the role of misperceptions, miscalculations and mistakes … suggests that the risk of nuclear war was greater than thought by decision-makers at the time and by commentators subsequently.' 39 Similarly, Réachbha
FitzGerald concluded a 2007 review of the literature with the idea that: 'recent research into the operational aspects of the crisis has revealed that both the US and the Soviet leaderships had less knowledge and control over their military than they or anybody else realized.' 40 The consensus even goes beyond the literature in English and extends to the award-winning 2014 volume in Italian by Leonardo Campus, I Sei Giorni Che Sconvolsero Il Mondo (The Six Days that Shook the World).
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Taken together, all those elements about the limits of controllability and predictability of the Crisis point to a role played by luck in its outcome. In 1994, Len Scott and Steve Smith already observed, there is now ample evidence that the fact that the crisis did not lead to nuclear war was due, in large part, to good luck. In our view this is a most important finding since it undermines the claims of those who think that nuclear crises can be safely managed and that command and control systems will work as they are meant to work. In a nutshell, then, even if one cannot know for sure what would have followed the first nuclear strike, the scholarship of the last three decades shows that the Crisis was much more dangerous than leaders thought at the time. Problems of limited or false information, misperceptions, limits of safety and presidential command and control over nuclear weapons as well as accidents susceptible to create the impression that war was imminent, could all have led to inadvertent escalation. A narrative of control cannot fully account for the peaceful outcome of the Crisis and the part played by luck.
Reasserting control by practical and epistemic inconsistencies
After those discoveries, the few voices who still want to argue that the dangers of the Crisis were manageable can only do so via an inconsistency: they at first claim to acknowledge the limits of safety and controllability of nuclear weapons and the unpredictability of all pathways to nuclear war, but they then either reduce the realm of what was possible to what is measurable, or reintroduce the idea of manageability as the inevitable outcome of policy-relevant research. In the first case, which I characterise as an epistemic inconsistency, the risk frame makes it impossible to account for the limits of control and safety identified above or for the role of luck, in particular if luck is defined as an effect of unquantifiable uncertainty. 46 In the second case, which I characterise as a practical inconsistency, the role of luck and the limits of controllability will be denied in practice so that acknowledging them will not lead to a questioning of managerialism as an approach of nuclear crises on epistemological, ethical, or political grounds. 
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Such epistemic inconsistency is frequently displayed in the limited literature in French on the subject. In most other cases, the role of luck is acknowledged in theory but its implications and the questions it would raise are immediately denied at the same time, via its reincorporation in a narrative of control. For instance, Marie-Hélène Labbé, who writes that 'for a week, the world came close to apocalypse' 56 in her two-page treatment of the Crisis, notes that 'later revelations nuanced the idealized image of a perfectly managed crisis' and recognises the pressure Castro put on Khrushchev to be more aggressive towards the US. However, she ends up underplaying the role of luck in the outcome of the Crisis: the 'risk [of use of nuclear weapons] … was omnipresent but controlled during the Cold War'. 57 Similarly, the 2014 Livre noir du nucléaire militaire accepts that the 1962 crisis is the closest humanity came to nuclear war and that it could have been triggered without political approval, but concludes by looking at the controllable side of the problem, suggesting that the two leaders should have learned from it that small nuclear arsenals are enough to deter. 58 This conclusion obviously ignores the episodes mentioned above in which the peaceful outcome of the Crisis is not reducible to a success of deterrence, notably because it resulted from a decision taken out of false information or because the exact cause of the behaviour is not well established.
Beyond the epistemic inconsistency, scholarship can escape the unbearable lightness of luck without actually refuting it by a form of practical inconsistency. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow's 1999 revised edition of the classic but highly criticised Essence of Decision exemplifies this tendency. They ostensibly accept normal accident theory, that is, the idea that tightly coupled and interactively complex systems like nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to accidents, yet they conclude with a recommendation in terms of manageability which is at odds with the theory or would at best assume that another disaster will happen before the nuclear one, which would make it less significant. 59 They conclude that 'the potential for dysfunctionality exists and must be managed ', 60 when the key insight of normal accident theory is that systemic accidents in complex and tightly coupled systems cannot be managed away. This is clear in Scott Sagan's summary in 2004: 'scholars in the "normal accidents theory" school have argued that organizations that exhibit both high degrees of interactive complexity and tightly coupled operations will suffer serious accidents despite their efforts to maintain high reliability and safety.' Benoît Pelopidas practical inconsistency. Nuclear crises have to remain manageable, so he starts his short analysis of the risk of nuclear escalation in history by deliberately setting aside the case of the Crisis. He can therefore conclude that: 'there does not seem to be any example when nuclear weapons have been really "close" to being employed'. 62 A similarly inconsistent reluctance to acknowledge the role of luck is observable in the writings of the late French nuclear strategist and policy adviser Thérèse Delpech. Given that she recognises Cuba as 'the most dangerous nuclear crisis so far' and accepts the widest variety of dangers, it is very revealing that she ends up hedging her acknowledgement of the role of luck in the outcome of the Crisis. She accepts that: 'during the second peak [of the Crisis, on 27 October], a nuclear war was almost launched on more than one occasion' 63 and recognises that escalation was possible during the blockade. 64 She also recognises the lack of information and existence of misperceptions on both sides, and acknowledges that the short-range atomic weapons in Cuba could have been fired. 65 Finally, she agrees with the highest assessment of the risk of nuclear retaliation and writes that: 'if those weapons had been fired at U.S. troops, the United States would have retaliated with nuclear weapons'. 66 Building on Nikolai Leonov's testimony mentioned above, she concludes, reluctantly and with a caveat that: 'Luck may have played a part as well.' 67 This is a foregone conclusion: for practical purposes, nuclear crises have to be managed, so they have to be manageable even if this conclusion depends on an inconsistent double operation of obfuscating the role of luck without being able to disprove it.
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Reasserting control by rejecting counterfactual thinking
In this section, I focus on rejection of counterfactual thinking as an epistemological hurdle that has led French scholarship away from a full acknowledgement of the danger of the Crisis. This rejection of counterfactual thinking seems to be a disciplinary limitation of diplomatic history, which has had a particularly strong influence on scholars of the Crisis in France.
A recent debate in Security Studies between a diplomatic historian and his political scientist colleague illustrates the reluctance of diplomatic historians vis-à-vis counterfactual thinking. 66 Ibid., p. 69. 67 Ibid., p. 10. Exceptions which fully recognise the features identified in the first section of this essay are Georges Le Guelte, Histoire de la menace nucléaire (Paris: Hatier, 1997), pp. 52-3 and Georges Le Guelte, Les armes nucléaires, mythes et réalités (Arles: Actes Sud, 2009), pp. 131-4. 68 Somehow even General Lucien Poirier falls for the practical inconsistency. In his 'elements pour une théorie de la crise', he fully acknowledges contingency and improvisations in crisis management, warns against the dangers of systematisation and notes how issues of accidents are left aside but ends up inviting continuous progress towards a 'science' that has to be possible. Lucien Poirier, Essais de strategie theorique (Paris: Les Sept Epees, 1982), pp. 370, 372, 374.
The unbearable lightness of luck a trained diplomatic historian turned security studies scholar, exposes a frequent concern among diplomatic historians: 'No matter how plausible, "what-ifs" are not part of our mission. This has led some historians to take a rather dim view of counterfactual exercises, believing they do violence to the craft of historical reconstruction.'
69 His scepticism appears clearly in his persisting sense that a historical argument without counterfactuals is possible and that some of the historians' critiques of counterfactual analysis remain valid. 
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Six decades later, the heir of Renouvin as Professor of the History of International Relations at the Sorbonne wrote: 'the historian … keeps a specificity. A part of his or her approach is empirical. … To that effect, the work on sources, and in particular on archives, remains at the heart of his or her craft.' 76 As suggested earlier in the debate between Gavin and Lebow, such empiricism -by treating counterfactual reasoning as an unacceptable scholarly practice -allows for a denial of the need to study the danger of the Crisis. Quite tellingly, Renouvin's direct successor interprets the outcome of the Crisis as resulting from 'tacit bargaining' between the two actors. 77 Even Vincent Touze, who wrote the most serious study of the Crisis available in French, ends up failing to entertain the possibility that it might have ended differently than it actually did and quickly dismisses attempts at considering possible outcomes as based on 'hypotheticals'. 80 He does so despite being well aware of the existing scholarship in English reviewed above. His denial is justified on the grounds of disciplinary boundaries and the impossibility of testing alternative outcomes; to him counterfactual thinking is illegitimate in political science. He writes: 'Sagan's goal is not to contribute to the study of foreign policy. His purpose is to contribute to accidents theory. As far as our subject is concerned, his examples are all hypothetical.' 81 Further, he continues: 'One can very well conceive of nuclear accidents during the crisis in the US … The effects they could have had belongs so much to speculation that the subject does not seem legitimate.' 82 If done rigorously, such 'speculation' is called counterfactual thinking.
Reasserting control by remembering an idiosyncratic experience of the Crisis exempt of fear Among policymakers, President Kennedy was particularly worried about inadvertent escalation and being forced to use nuclear weapons 83 and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan lost sleep over the dangers of the Crisis; on 4 November, he assessed that 'everything was at stake…' in the Crisis.
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On the contrary, French President Charles De Gaulle did not voice any particular fear at the time and the French military and intelligentsia do not seem to have felt such a threat, except in press reports for a few days after Kennedy's speech on 22 October. 85 A biographer of de Gaulle, for instance, assumes that 'because no American missiles were based in France, … she would not be an early target, even if it came to a nuclear exchange', 86 which is evidence for the 'great calmness' of France during the Crisis. 87 Macmillan confirms this impression when he writes that, faced with the threat of imminent nuclear war, 'the French were … contemptuous' 88 while other British Cabinet ministers worried that war was imminent. On the evening of 28 October 1962, Quintin Hogg, Baron Hailsham of St Marylebone, Lord President of the Council, whose wife had just given birth, considered whether to baptise the child himself. 89 On the contrary, Etienne Burin des Roziers, general secretary of the Elysee Palace, makes fun of the fear of disaster in his diary, which was not meant to be made public before decades. 90 In the press and the population, a high level of fear was felt for at least a week in the US and the UK. On 2 November 1962, the New Yorker could record: 'We waited for something to happen, gauging, minute by minute, in something like pain, our ignorance of what the next minute would bring, and feeling the dead weight of the conviction that no one on earth -not the president, not the Russians-knew what it would bring.' 91 As Alice George summarised it, 'for many Americans, it represented one week of emprisonment in fear … For many Americans, the clock was ticking loudly, and like men before a firing squad, they waited and wondered whether they would feel anything before the end came.' 92 The French press, relying mostly on American information, generally only insisted on the risk of war following President Kennedy's speech, around 24-8 October.
93 Joelle Beurier's study of the year 1962 as represented in the French popular photo-journalistic outlet Paris-Match shows that in its pages the violence of the world was dramatised during the first half of the year but euphemised during the second, when the events this article engages with took place. Indeed, the only French source suggesting serious fears of nuclear war came from the French Embassy in Washington, which expressed in a telegram deep worries associated with not having an anti-nuclear shelter.
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A few elements of the Crisis appeared on French television: the 8 pm news programme, for example, showed footage of the meeting between President Kennedy and Andreii Gromyko, as well as the confrontation between Adlai Stevenson and Valerian Zorin at the 26 October session of the UN Security Council. 95 On balance, however, none of this conveyed a significant level of fear or awareness of the danger in the context of the time. A study of the world news segment broadcast in French movie theaters at the time, Regards sur le monde, suggests this absence of fear very strongly. The Crisis does not appear until 31 October 1962 (ten days after the Kennedy speech, and more than two weeks after the beginning of American suspicions about missiles in Cuba). This three-and-a-halfminute segment emphasised control in the voiceover: 'anything was possible, then the miracle of wisdom and firmness defeated the fatality of unfolding dangers'. 96 Interestingly, the order in which news items were presented that week did not change to reflect a particularly grave danger: the sport section followed, as usual.
Similarly, the main outlet on military issues in France, the Revue de Défense Nationale, carried a few columns worrying about the increasing arms trade between Cuba and the Soviet Union, but prior to 1963 it published nothing in particular on the Crisis itself. This is all the more surprising as two articles published earlier in 1962 in this same journal discuss the risk of inadvertent escalation. The Crisis benefits from a longer article than other events including a few titles mentioning the possibility of a war but she notes that the lexicon as well as the iconography are downplaying the danger. 94 Maurice Vaïsse, foreword in Vaïsse (ed.), L'Europe et la crise des missiles de Cuba, p. 9. This is evidence that for the French at the time, this is an Americano-Soviet crisis and that they are not involved in it. Maurice Vaïsse, 'Une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps', in Vaïsse (ed.), L'Europe et la crise des missiles de Cuba, p. 89; interview with Maurice Vaïsse, Paris, 27 August 2013. French domestic politics at the time were intense focal points, which easily distracted from considering the Crisis: Algeria, which had been a French department since 1830, had become independent a few months before, on 18 March 1962 and, on 28 October, in the middle of the Crisis, a referendum took place, deciding that for the first time the French President will be elected directly by the citizens. A failure to win this referendum would have meant the end of the Presidency of Charles de Gaulle, after four years in power under a new Constitution and only a few months after he survived an assassination attempt. As a consequence, the speech of US Secretary of Defense McNamara on the shift to flexible response has more impact on the French conversation than the Crisis. This mostly reflects a fear of conventional war in Europe and a fear centered on Berlin. 95 Available at: {http://www.ina.fr/video/CAF97049141/rencontre-gromyko-kennedy-video.html}; {http://www. ina.fr/video/CAF97027208/conseil-de-securite-video.html}; {http://www.ina.fr/video/CAF97027010/depart-uthant-pour-la-havane-video.html}; accessed 7 December 2016. 96 Available at: {http://www.ina.fr/video/AFE86003852} accessed 16 May 2016, my translation. 97 Claude Delmas, 'Reflexions sur la guerre', writes that: 'the strategy of deterrence includes risks, because of the possibilities of misunderstandings, of the obsessive fear of surprise attack (an atomic "Pearl Harbour") and mutual difficulties of appreciation of intentions; finally deterrence is hard to stabilize due to the arms race (more qualitative than quantitative).' See Revue de Defense Nationale (July 1962), p. 1186, my translation. In the same journal, Colonel de Saint Germain wrote: 'the nuclear phase can only be an accident, or a series of
The unbearable lightness of luck Prominent French strategist General Pierre-Marie Gallois was already convinced at the time that the situation was safe due to information he received from his contacts in NATO, who confirmed that the NATO military did not feel 'on the brink'. 98 Pierre Hassner, then a close collaborator of major French strategist Raymond Aron, emphasised the contrast between the French indifference and the British alarm and anticipation of the end of the world. 99 While many French intellectuals, in particular Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre, had taken an early stance on nuclear weapons after Hiroshima, the French intelligentsia was conspicuously silent during the Crisis. 100 Of course, one needs to keep in mind that Camus passed away before the Crisis, in January For most of his life, General Gallois -Aron's intellectual adversary in the so-called 'Great Debate' over French nuclear strategy in the early 1960s -did not think the Crisis worth writing about. For him, the evolution and outcome of the Crisis were just additional evidence that nuclear weapons created a shared rationality -even when dealing with enemies like the Soviet Union. Gallois felt that the Crisis was not threatening because its progressive evolution led to the official alerting of strategic nuclear forces that in turn forced the two great powers to negotiate. 'Surprise was impossible.' 116 This has been a consistent interpretation over the years on the part of Gallois, who never considered the Crisis to be a 'nuclear crisis'. 117 that he had been exposed to literature about accidental use of nuclear weapons and inadvertent nuclear war.
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A third essential French nuclear strategist, André Beaufre, gave a revealing interview in 1971, in which he explicitly treats nuclear war as impossible because nuclear dynamics are perfectly predictable and controllable. When asked whether he believed in the risk of a total nuclear war, he responded:
at the nuclear level, we are able to … exactly calculate what the war will look like. We were not able to do so with much smaller means such as the pistol, the machine gun, or even the canon. Errors and dreams were allowed. Today, this [sic] is no longer possible. We are working with something which is infinitely calculable and we know ahead of time what the results will be. Men, because they are not crazy, will not do certain things. … Therefore, I do not believe in the great catastrophe nor in atomic death. 119 Surprisingly, and very tellingly for the argument of this article, this opinion is shared by a longtime opponent of nuclear weapons, General Claude Le Borgne, who described the Crisis as 'sort of a psychodrama that the two great heads of state, then nuclear beginners, played for their own education', 120 adding that 'the fact that public opinion saw the world on the brink of war is another matter, a moot point'. 121 In a way, this startling absence of fear during the Crisis has led both the conservative proponents of rational deterrence theory and radical anti-colonialists on the left to embrace a narrative based on the retrospective illusion of safety and control. 122 Even the official directives from the French Ministry of Education regarding the teaching of this episode in middle and high school perpetuate this retrospective illusion of control compatible with an experience of the event devoid of fear. 123 Teaching the Crisis is no longer mentioned in the official guidelines the years for which school is still mandatory. It has disappeared from the guidelines for ages 11 to 15 since 2013 and the Crisis does not appear in the list of 43 landmark dates from the third millennium BC to today that French students have to master at the end of mandatory schooling. 124 For the rest of high school, the recommendations suggest that the Crisis allows the missile crisis in conversations with his family. This might have happened had he thought there was a serious risk of nuclear war. Interview with Philippe Gallois, 13 March 2013. 118 In the documentation he kept, one finds an article from Le Monde of 20 February 1960 with an insert on p. 2, teacher to: 'insist … on the weight of deterrence and on the will of the players to avoid a direct confrontation'. 125 Overall, a study of the French experience of the Crisis and discourse about it among scholars, military officers and education officials shows an absence of fear that has been translated over time into a narrative of control. This relative fearlessness contrasts both with implicit assumptions in policy circles of a common understanding of the Crisis and with security studies scholars' conviction in the dread induced by the destructive capability of nuclear weapons.
Conclusion
Full awareness of the limits of knowledge of and control over nuclear weapons is crucial for historical accuracy, for nuclear learning, and as a starting for a fruitful nuclear weapons policy debate that would include strategic, ethical, and political concerns.
This awareness is all the more important as overconfidence has been shown to be a cause of increased danger. Therefore, learning from the Cuban Missile Crisis is essential given that, over the last thirty years, analysts have discovered and confirmed that it was one of the most dangerous events in the history of the nuclear age, the peaceful outcome of which was partly due to luck, and that in the preceding three decades they had been overconfident in the ability of good management to explain its peaceful outcome. In order to understand the construction of such overconfidence, I have accepted the idea that learning occurred mostly at the national level and focused on the French case, in comparative perspective. I have first shown how those scholarly findings have not been adequately refuted and argued that those who do not take these elements seriously have done so via epistemological or practical inconsistencies. The rejection of counterfactual thinking as a legitimate scholarly practice is another way of rendering these findings invisible without having to refute them. Finally, I have used the French example to show that an experience and official memory of the Crisis that is not based on fear does over time fuel overconfidence in the safety, controllability, and predictability of nuclear crises. American and British elites and populations did not grasp the full extent of the dangers at the time but, unlike the French, they certainly experienced fear. These ideational and disciplinary factors would be sufficient to prevent the problem from emerging as an issue of public concern in France; they also call for responsible nuclear scholarship to address them without waiting for structural or policy change. This opens up three avenues for research.
First, social scientists cannot let Fidel Castro take the unbearable lightness of luck with him to the grave. Following from the efforts of cognitive psychologists to uncover our tendencies to deny luck retrospectively, further exploration of the politics of luck and how the distinction between risk and uncertainty (as uncontrollability and unknowability even of the boundaries of the possible) has been blurred would be a first critical step towards a reconceptualisation of nuclear controllability, a reconceptualisation that would place luck at the heart of political and ethical action, power and responsibility over time. 126 At the empirical level, this approach would involve treating the question of 'how close did we come to nuclear disaster' as a starting point, and focusing on pathways towards disasters rather than patterns identified in the past and expected to bind possible futures.
Second, cases of near-nuclear use need to be requalified as events worth investigating. 127 Diplomatic historians and security studies scholars could fruitfully join forces independently of their views on the value of counterfactuals. Indeed, we need further investigations into the history of nuclear-armed states both to unearth primary documentation about the past security and safety record of nuclear arsenals and to allow for rigorous counterfactual thinking, going beyond risk thinking. 128 Comparative critical oral histories of nuclear close calls would likewise help recover the limits of control over nuclear weapons as a legitimate object of scholarly interest. Such an approach would also tackle directly the scholarly problem of uncritical reliance on accounts from former officials, while at the same time addressing the policy problems that result from misguided assumptions of a shared experience and interpretation of events like the Crisis. 129 The empirical dimension of this article is only a first step in this direction. 130 This research programme allows analysts to start working against overconfidence without waiting for structural or institutional reforms and suggests that they have a responsibility to do so.
Third, in security studies, it is crucial to reassert the socially and historically constructed process of valuation of nuclear weapons instead of perpetuating the widespread assumption that the destructive capability of nuclear weapons triggers adequate fear, which in turn initiates a learning process that is sufficient for existential deterrence to work everywhere. If the relevant French decision-makers were indeed adequately afraid at the time but did not leave any evidence of it, the contentions of this article would remain valid: that absence of evidence would only be additional evidence of the scholarly blinders entailed by a rejection of counterfactual thinking; in any case, and whatever the unspoken thoughts of decision-makers at the time, their public display of fearlessness would be consequential for future generations of leaders. Evidence of private doubts on the part of statesmen would only bring to the fore the need to reconnect nuclear weapons scholarship with democratic theorising and the issue of citizens' right to know. Identifying the effects of rejecting counterfactual thinking and documenting the diverse experiences and memorialisations of nuclear danger as components of a process of valuation of nuclear weapons are ways to understand and counter overconfidence in their controllability. This is crucial for policy-relevant learning because the coexistence of this diversity of memories with the retrospective illusions of unanimity and control gives an unsettling resonance to Peter Sloterdijk's claim: 'the only catastrophe that seems clear to all is the catastrophe which no one survives'.
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